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Iran's Nuclear Program 
 
Johnson Lin 
I. Introduction 
 
The potential Iranian nuclear weapons 
program is an issue of utmost concern to the 
international community.  Iran has been deemed by 
the U.S. State Department as a state sponsor of 
terror, and it has the dangerous potential to use its 
nuclear program to construct nuclear weapons.  
Iranian leaders have consistently declared Iran’s 
right to pursue peaceful nuclear technologies, but 
they have not fully adhered to the international 
inspections and regulations that are necessary to 
ensure its peaceful nature.  While there isn’t 
irrefutable evidence linking Iran’s nuclear 
advancement to nuclear weapons, many signs seem 
to point in that direction.   
The problem of Iran’s nuclear program fits 
perfectly within the realist theory of international 
relations.  Despite the existence of the United 
Nations and other multinational organizations, 
realism argues that states exist in an anarchic 
environment.  Uncertainty about the capabilities 
and intentions of Iran’s nuclear program creates 
serious security dilemmas for the international 
community, particularly the U.S. and Israel.  The 
international community has acted to thwart Iran’s 
suspect nuclear weapons program. Some of the 
options available can be successful and others are 
doomed to fail.  Understanding the history of Iran’s 
nuclear program is necessary for understanding 
how the international community ought deal with 
this potentially deadly problem. 
 
II. History of Iran’s nuclear program 
 
Iran’s nuclear program began in 1957 through 
the United States “Atoms for Peace” program.  
Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the 
program promoted the development of safe and 
peaceful nuclear technologies.  It strengthened the 
alliance between the two, which was vital to U.S. 
national security interests because of the Cold War 
and Iran’s strategic location on the border between 
the Soviet Union and the Middle East.  President 
Eisenhower sought to increase military, economic, 
and civilian assistance to gain a greater strategic 
position with Iran.  The aid to Iran’s nuclear 
program grew from U.S. national security interests, 
an example of international realism.  Under Atoms 
for Peace, the United States agreed to lease “Iran up 
to 13.2 pounds of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for 
research purposes” and also supplied a five-
megawatt reactor for the production of electricity.1  
In return for U.S. nuclear assistance, Iran signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on July 1, 
1968, the first day the treaty was open for 
signature. 
The NPT originated from the international 
community’s growing awareness of the inherent 
dangers of the proliferation of nuclear arms.  After 
witnessing the destructiveness of nuclear weapons 
against Japan during World War II, many believed 
an increase in the number of countries with nuclear 
weapons threatened global security.  The treaty 
served international security interests by advancing 
nuclear non-proliferation, disarming and 
dismantling existing nuclear weapons, and 
advocating for peaceful nuclear development.2  
Iran, having just initiated a meaningful nuclear 
program, signed the treaty as a non-nuclear 
signatory, agreeing not to acquire or manufacture 
nuclear weapons, to accept safeguards that verified 
nonproliferation obligations and to negotiate in 
good faith for the cessation of the nuclear arms 
race.  These conditions were supposed to bar Iran, 
and other non-nuclear states, from developing 
nuclear weapons.  In return for its agreement to 
these provisions, under Article IV of the treaty, Iran 
gained recognition of its  “inalienable right…to 
develop research, production and use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes” in accordance to 
articles I and II.3  Iran’s signing of the NPT 
publicly signified its intention to abstain from 
developing nuclear weapons. 
With a commitment to peaceful and 
responsible nuclear development, Iran was able to 
acquire nuclear assistance from Western states such 
as France and Germany throughout the 1970s.  The 
nuclear program was a priority of Shah Reza 
Pahlavi, Iran’s leader, because he believed that the 
exploration and development of alternative forms 
                                                             
1 Greg Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Council on 
   Foreign Relations (March 10, 2010) 
2 Paul Lettow, “Strengthening the Nuclear  
   Nonproliferation Regime,” Council on Foreign  
   Relations 54 (April 2010) 
3 Lettow, “Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation  
   Regime” 
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of energy production was necessary for the Iranian 
economy given the economic uncertainty resulting 
from regional wars that disrupted Iran’s oil 
production and from predictions of looming energy 
shortfalls.4  Instability in the Middle East in the 
1970s pushed Iran towards developing nuclear 
energy, a means of meeting its energy demands 
beyond oil.  In March 1974, Iran announced its 
plans to produce 23,000 megawatts of electricity 
from nuclear power.  This ambitious goal would 
have been able to meet a great deal of Iran’s energy 
needs, but the amount of nuclear energy necessary 
to do so was also enough to produce about 600-700 
nuclear warheads.5  Iran’s growing ambitions about 
the possibilities of a large nuclear program began to 
rattle its partners around the world. 
Despite the Shah’s assurance that his nuclear 
program had only peaceful intentions, foreign 
governments increasingly became reluctant to aid 
Iranian nuclear development.  A United States 
special national intelligence estimate asserted, “The 
ambitions of the Shah could lead Iran to pursue 
nuclear weapons, especially in the shadow of 
India’s nuclear test in May 1974.”6  Furthermore, in 
an interview with the French newspaper Le Monde, 
the Shah was quoted as saying that Iran would, 
“sooner than is believed” be “in possession of a 
nuclear bomb,” and Assadollah Alam, the Shah’s 
court minister, claimed on several occasions that 
the Shah wanted a nuclear bomb but found it 
expedient to adamantly deny it at the time.7  These 
indications that Iran’s nuclear ambitions was 
leaning towards more than merely energy 
production pushed the U.S. towards taking a stiffer 
approach against Iran. 
By the time of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in the 
late 1970s, France and Germany began 
withdrawing their support of Iran’s nuclear 
program.  The chaos resulting from the revolution, 
primarily the hostage crisis and the regime change 
to a hostile Islamic republic, created a dangerous 
situation that Western governments believed would 
only be exacerbated with the inclusion of nuclear 
technologies.  During this period, Iran’s nuclear 
program slowed dramatically.  The deterioration of 
the program was the result of a combination of 
factors: the absence of foreign assistance, Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s opposition to nuclear 
                                                             
4 Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program” 
5 Abbas Milani, “The Shah’s Atomic Dreams,” Foreign  
   Policy (December 29, 2010) 
6 Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program” 
7 Milani, “The Shah’s Atomic Dreams” 
technology, the mass exodus of nuclear scientists, 
and Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s nuclear facility at 
Osirak, which removed an immediate threat to 
Iran.8  However, this break in Iran’s nuclear 
development was ephemeral.  It ended with the 
death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the 
subsequent ascension of Ayatollah Khamenei.  This 
change of Iran’s leadership changed the trajectory 
of Iran’s nuclear desires. 
Ayatollah Khamenei had much more of a 
positive view of nuclear power than his 
predecessor, and initiated plans to rebuild the 
nuclear program in Tehran.  In the 1991 Gulf War 
against Iraq, coalition forces, of which Iran was not 
a participant, discovered a clandestine Iraqi nuclear 
program.  With the increase of a Western presence 
in the Persian Gulf and the real possibility of Iraqi 
nuclear armament, Iran perceived increasing 
security threats.  With a neighboring rival having 
almost developed nuclear weapons, and Western 
powers exerting influence in the region, Iran 
believed that it could no longer depend on its 
traditional non-nuclear defenses.9  Following the 
tenets of realism, insecurity pushed Iran to further 
develop an indigenous nuclear program. 
In addition to defense, nuclear weapons would 
also useful for Iranian attainment of regional 
hegemony.  Iran remembers the glories of the 
ancient Persian Empire, which was decimated by 
raiding Arabs, who were spreading Islam across the 
region.  Iranians beam with nationalism and see 
themselves as separate and superior to neighboring 
Arabs.  This is evident in Iran’s adherence to Shi’a 
Islam as opposed to the Sunni sect popular among 
Arabs.  Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
Middle East was no longer a battleground between 
superpowers.  New regional leaders could emerge, 
and a functional Iranian nuclear weapon would 
cement Iran’s superiority over its Arab rivals and 
leadership in the region.  In order to construct 
nuclear weapons, Iran has received assistance from 
non-Western states such as Russia, China, Pakistan, 
and North Korea.10 
As Iran accelerated its development of nuclear 
technologies in the 1990s, it began moving astray 
from its commitments as a signatory to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.  With insufficient 
oversight from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), Iran developed “a vast network of 
uranium mines, enrichment plants, conversion sites, 
                                                             
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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and research reactors” and constructed other 
nuclear facilities, to supply domestically produced 
nuclear fuels.  This immense network of uranium 
production now allows Iran to produce an estimated 
2.77 kg of low-enriched uranium per day.11  Due to 
Iranian duplicity, diplomatic stalling, and 
unwillingness from the international community to 
enforce the conditions of the NPT in a meaningful 
way, Iran has been uninhibited in its enrichment of 
uranium “on a scale that cannot plausibly be meant 
to produce fuel for a nuclear power reactor but 
could be used to produce the fissile material for a 
nuclear weapon.”12  In addition to the large scale of 
Iran’s nuclear development, the nuclear program 
has been kept extremely secretive.  This secrecy 
seems indicative of intent to hide aspects of a 
nuclear program that are unacceptable to the 
international community.  If it were completely 
peaceful, it could likely gain foreign assistance in 
return for international oversight.  Iran consistent 
refusal of international oversight, despite the 
possible benefits of it, signals that its nuclear 
ambitions are not completely peaceful. 
Despite speculations of Iran’s intention to 
construct nuclear weapons, there isn’t any 
conclusive evidence proving it.  There is 
uncertainty about its intentions because the 
“existing means of detecting, determining, and 
enforcing violations of safeguard obligations, and 
the will to do so, are inadequate for the task.”13  
The IAEA is incapable of decisively determining 
Iranian intentions.  While unlikely, in light of the 
lack of evidence, it is still a possibility that Iran’s 
nuclear technology will pursue strictly peaceful 
purposes.  Iranian antagonism towards international 
interference in its nuclear development may be 
more indicative of its distrust of the international 
community rather than of its intentions of secretly 
constructing nuclear weapons. 
Iran’s current nuclear technology and weapons 
technology necessary for the transportation of 
possible nuclear warheads is largely based on 
foreign assistance, particularly from North Korea.  
North Korean technicians and military experts have 
supported Iran’s path to achieve nuclear bomb 
capability and have aided in increasing the range of 
its ballistic missiles.  A majority of Iran’s nuclear 
centrifuges are primarily based on North Korean 
designs, which are more technically advanced and 
                                                             
11 Ibid. 
12 Lettow, “Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation  
    Regime” 
13 Ibid. 
greater in size than those indigenous to Iran14.  This 
relationship between Iran and North Korea is 
extremely alarming given North Korea’s status as 
the only state to have officially withdrawn from the 
NPT, and to have developed nuclear weapons after 
signing the treaty.  Iran’s dependence on North 
Korea may be a signal of its intentions to follow a 
similar path of nuclear development. 
It is also believed that Iran gained some 
nuclear assistance from Pakistan.  Abdul Qadeer 
Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, had 
operated an international nuclear black market in 
the 1990s.  In 2004, he confessed to this network of 
proliferation, and is believed to have contacted and 
sold centrifuges and blueprints to Iran in 1994.  
Following his confession, Pakistan took steps to 
neutralize Khan’s network to safeguard its nuclear 
weapons and technologies.  However, there is still 
concern that parts of Khan’s black market network 
could still be open, and that Iran is the most active 
customer in the nuclear black market.  Iran’s access 
to nuclear materials beyond the supervision of the 
international community is a source of concern.15 
In recent years, the international community 
has become increasingly alarmed at the potential of 
a nuclear-armed Iran.  Western intelligence 
agencies have attained large amounts of 
information that “provide snapshots of an extensive 
and sophisticated weapons program whose goal is 
to produce a uranium implosion device.”16  In 
response to criticisms and accusations of its nuclear 
ambitions, Iran consistently declares its sovereign 
right to pursue nuclear technology.  This pursuit of 
nuclear technology has gotten alarmingly close to 
nuclear capability, and Israeli intelligence estimates 
that with the current rate of Iran’s development, it 
is about three years away from developing a 
nuclear weapon.17  Many believe that Iranian 
nuclear weapons are imminent.  While a nuclear-
armed Iran would be a threat to the entire 
international community, Israel would face the 
                                                             
14 Global Security Newswire, “Iran Seeks Nuclear  
    Scientists, Former Diplomat Asserts” (December 23,  
    2010) 
15 David Montero, “Report: Pakistani scientist A.Q.  
    Khan aided Iran,” Christian Science Monitor (May 4,  
    2007) 
16 Mark Fitzpatrick, “Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and  
    Biological Capabilities – Executive Summary,”  
    International Institute for Strategic Studies (February  
    3, 2011) 
17 Arthur Bright, “Iran nuclear program delayed, says  
    Israeli minister,” Christian Science Monitor  
    (December 30, 2010) 
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greatest security threats from Iran, aptly expressed 
in current Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s 
persistent anti-Zionist rhetoric.  In 2006, during the 
war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, 
Ahmadinejad said in regards to the conflict, “…the 
main solution is for the elimination of the Zionist 
regime” because Israel “is an illegitimate regime, 
there is no legal basis for its existence.”18 
Along with President Ahmadinejad’s harsh 
rhetoric, Iran’s weapons capabilities have greatly 
increased in recent years, and now pose a serious 
threat to Israel’s national security.  Its advanced 
weapons are seen as a precursor to greater military 
ambitions that include nuclear weapons.  In 2008, 
Iran test-fired nine missiles, including an advanced 
version of the Shahab-3, a medium-range ballistic 
missile.  It reportedly has a range of up to 2,000 
kilometers, and can be armed with a conventional 
high-explosive warhead, a chemical warhead, 
submunitions warhead, or a nuclear warhead.19  The 
Shahab-3 missiles can theoretically carry possible 
Iranian nuclear warheads to Israel, placing Israel in 
a very precarious situation.  As such, Israel is often 
the most assertive member of the international 
community in calls for actions to stop Iranian 
nuclear development.  Regardless of whether or not 
there is international support, Israel may act 
unilaterally to stop Iran’s nuclear program. 
Under the assumption that Iran is in fact 
developing nuclear weapons, the international 
community has sought to implement means of 
disrupting Iran’s nuclear advancement.  Multilateral 
and unilateral, specifically Israeli, approaches have 
been discussed.  Some efforts, such as sanctions 
and covert operations, have already been 
implemented.  Others, such as preventive strike and 
regime change, are viable options in the near future.  
These options approach the problem from different 
perspectives and are not mutually exclusive.  
Regardless of which options are taken against Iran, 
success must be measured not only in whether Iran 
is able to construct nuclear weapons, but also cost 
to the quality of life of the Iranian population, and 
the potential of escalation to war. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
18 Sean Yoong, “Ahmadinejad: Destroy Israel, End  
    Crisis,” Washington Post (August 3, 2006) 
19 BBC News, “Iran sends missile test warning” (July 9,  
    2008) 
III. Option 1 - Accept proliferation 
 
Although many believe that the dangers posed 
by allowing Iran to continue its nuclear program 
demand international actions preventing its 
construction of nuclear weapons, the potential 
dangers may be overblown.  The fact that there 
isn’t any conclusive evidence about the purpose of 
Iran’s nuclear program must be emphasized.  Also, 
recent events in the Middle East and within Iran 
have triggered a de-emphasis on the nuclear 
program as Iranian leaders seek to satisfy economic 
demands by its public.  Moreover, even if Iran were 
to develop nuclear weapons, it may not be any 
more threatening to the international community 
than it currently is.  The option of inaction, and 
thereby allowing Iran to continue its nuclear 
program with the possibility of its constructing a 
nuclear weapon, is one that needs to be seriously 
considered by the international community. 
With the unrest across the Middle East and 
rising inflation in Iran, Iran’s nuclear program is 
not currently a priority for its leaders.  2011 has 
been a year in which the Iranian regime has placed 
greater emphasis on its domestic agenda because of 
rising inflation resulting from recent cuts to 
government subsidies on gasoline, fuel, and bread.  
With public outcries against its dampened 
economy, developing nuclear technology has 
become less urgent for the regime.  Inflation is “not 
at 10 percent but perceived by average Iranians to 
be 50 percent.”20  Sanctions on Iran have restricted 
its economy, forcing it to divert resources and 
attention away from producing a nuclear arsenal 
and towards dealing with its economy.  A de-
emphasized nuclear program means that immediate 
forceful action is neither required nor prudent.  The 
pressures on its economy may force Iran to work 
with foreign states, opening the door to solving the 
nuclear problem diplomatically.  Iran’s nuclear 
advancement does not appear to be a threat in the 
immediate future. 
On the other hand, even if de-emphasized, 
Iran’s nuclear program is still a serious threat in the 
long run.  If the international community allows 
Iran to continue its nuclear program and it 
successfully produces nuclear weapons, the 
international community fears that Iran will have 
increased coercive influence over its neighboring 
states.  These fears may be unfounded since 
                                                             
20 Scott Peterson, “New Year priorities: Tehran focused 
    on turmoil at home, not nuclear program,” Christian  
    Science Monitor (December 31, 2010) 
4
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2011 [2012], Art. 23
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2011/iss1/23
 221
coercion backed by threats of nuclear weapons 
historically have not been more successful than 
coercion without such threats.  For example, the 
United States’ nuclear arsenal did not enhance the 
effectiveness of its demands of North Korea to 
release the USS Pueblo in 1968, Israeli threats 
against Syria prior to the 1982 Lebanon War were 
unsuccessful, and British threats against Argentina 
over the Falkland Islands in 1982 failed despite its 
possession of nuclear arms.21  One possible reason 
for the ineffectiveness of nuclear-backed threats is 
that the state threatened understands the 
unlikeliness of the actual use of nuclear weapons.  
Deterrents are ineffective unless the opposition 
believes that the threat is real and imminent.  Any 
possible use of nuclear weapons would universally 
be condemned by the international community and 
would lead to serious repercussions, thereby 
neutralizing the threat.  Following historical trends, 
Iran’s possible nuclear weapons would not increase 
its coercive influence over regional neighbors.   
Another fear of a nuclearized Iran is its 
potential to unleash a nuclear arms race in the 
Middle East.  Secretary of State Clinton and Vice 
President Biden have both warned “Iran’s actions 
risk sparking a nuclear arms race in the Middle 
East.”22  While this is a possibility, it is also an 
overstated danger.  There are only a handful of 
countries in the region, such as Libya, Syria, and 
Saudi Arabia, which have the technological 
capacity and the economic wherewithal to develop 
a meaningful nuclear program.  Some of these 
states have previously had nuclear programs but 
have since given them up.  Even if nuclear arms 
proliferated in the region, the real danger is not 
necessarily nuclear proliferation, but from a nuclear 
conflict.23  The dangers of nuclear arms are not 
necessarily inherent, but result from their use.   
Although Israel would be the most likely 
target of Iranian nuclear weapons, history indicates 
that nuclear proliferation has the effect of deterring 
nuclear wars rather than provoking them.  Nuclear 
states may still conflict with one another, but 
nuclear weapons have never been brought into the 
conflict.  For example, during the Cold War, 
neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. used their massive 
                                                             
21 Matthew Fuhrmann & Todd S. Sechser, “Would a  
    nuclear-armed Iran really be so dangerous?” Christian  
    Science Monitor (January 12, 2011) 
22 BBC News, “US leader Biden says Iran may spark  
    nuclear arms race” (May 6, 2010) 
23 Stephen M. Walt, “Iran, arms races, and war,” Foreign  
    Policy (October 1, 2009) 
stash of nuclear weapons.  In the current state of 
Indian-Pakistani relations, the two have not used 
nuclear arms despite mutual animosities.  While 
these states conflict with one another, both sides 
understand the dire consequences of a nuclear 
attack.  Pax Atomica, the theory of mutually 
assured destruction, deters the use of nuclear 
weapons.  It is unlikely that nuclear war between 
Iran and Israel would occur even if Iran were to 
develop nuclear arms.  Nuclear war between the 
two would be too dangerous and the notion of 
mutually assured destruction would encourage 
greater prudence in their bilateral relations.  Iranian 
leaders understand that if they were to use nuclear 
arms, it would be reciprocated leading to massive 
destruction on both sides.  This diminishes the 
likelihood of a nuclear conflict. 
Although it is unlikely that Iran will use any 
nuclear weapons it possibly develops, a major fear 
is that the weapons will fall into the hands of 
terrorists.  The proliferation of nuclear arms may 
spread to Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, or other groups.  In 
1998, the U.S. Justice Department charged that 
Osama bin Laden called for “al-Qaeda to put aside 
its differences with Shi’ite Muslim terrorist 
organizations, including the government of Iran and 
its affiliated terrorist group Hezbollah, to cooperate 
against their perceived common enemy, the United 
States and its allies.” Iran has indirectly supplied al-
Qaeda and its affiliated groups with resources in 
their mutual war against the United States.  
However, it is unlikely that Iran would directly 
supply al-Qaeda with a nuclear weapon.  The two 
share a common enemy, but also have divergent 
ideologies.  Iran promotes Shi’a fundamentalist 
movements in the Middle East, while al-Qaeda is a 
Sunni jihadist movement.  Iran would much more 
likely share its nuclear weapons with Hezbollah, a 
terrorist organization essentially created by Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guards.  Hezbollah has caused 
several conflicts with Israel since its founding in 
the 1980s and Iran has several weapons smuggling 
routes to the group that can be used to smuggle 
nuclear warheads to Hezbollah.  Neither al-Qaeda 
nor Hezbollah has demonstrated reluctance in the 
possibility of using nuclear weapons.   
The potential of terrorists groups using 
Iranian-developed nuclear weapons is a very deadly 
one, and is the most dangerous aspect of accepting 
proliferation.  This may be the best argument 
against allowing Iran to continue its nuclear 
program.  However dangerous this threat is, the 
possibility of it actually occurring is low when 
considering the reasons why Iran wants nuclear 
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weapons.  If the construction of nuclear weapons 
were key to Iran’s regional hegemony, terrorist use 
of those weapons would surely diminish Iran’s 
leadership in the region and would instead solidify 
Iran’s status as a dangerous pariah state.  The use of 
its nuclear weapons would be counterproductive to 
Iran’s interests, and it would be in its best interest 
not to allow terrorist organizations to use it. 24 
An Iranian nuclear weapons program is more 
likely to be used for defensive rather than offensive 
purposes.  One of the key reasons for Iranian 
nuclear ambitions is perceived threats in the region.  
With the 2011 NATO air strikes in Libya, some see 
nuclear weapons as the only useful deterrent 
against foreign intervention.  The North Korean 
regime has stated “Libya’s dismantling of its 
nuclear weapons program has made it vulnerable to 
military intervention by the West.”  Halting a 
nuclear program is seen as a bait and switch 
approach that left Libya defenseless against 
consequent Western attacks. 25  Iran’s regime, with 
close nuclear ties to North Korea, likely has a 
common understanding of the use of nuclear 
weapons as a deterrent against the West.  With an 
increasing foreign presence in the Middle East, Iran 
sees its nuclear program as the only means of 
providing defense against perceived hostilities. 
The option of accepting proliferation may not 
be as dangerous as is often assumed.  While 
proliferation of nuclear weapons is dangerous, a 
nuclear-armed Iran will not likely be any more 
dangerous than any other nuclear-armed state.  
Based on historical precedents, Iran will not have 
any more coercive influence over its neighbors, nor 
will it start a nuclear conflict.  It is possible that a 
nuclearized Iran would ignore historical precedent 
and launch a nuclear war, but in reality, Iran’s 
leaders should be too rational to actually do so.  
The only serious threat of Iranian nuclear weapons 
is that terrorist organizations may procure and use 
them.  However, this would run counter to Iran’s 
interests.  Instead, nuclear weapons will most likely 
be used for defenses against Western threats.  
Allowing Iran to construct a nuclear weapon, 
through inaction from the international community, 
is an option that needs to be considered by world 
leaders. 
                                                             
24 Steven Emerson & Joel Himelfarb, “Would Iran 
    Provide A Nuclear Weapon to Terrorists?” in Focus  
    Quarterly 3 (Winter 2009) 
25 Mark McDonald, “North Korea Suggests Libya  
    Should Have Kept Nuclear Program,” New York  
    Times (March 24, 2011) 
IV. Option 2 - Sanctions 
 
Sanctions have been supported on a unilateral 
and multilateral basis as a means for curbing 
Iranian access to nuclear materials necessary and 
dissuading it from developing nuclear weapons.  
Despite Iran’s persistent claims that its nuclear 
program is strictly for peaceful purposes, its 
development seems to go beyond what is necessary 
for mere energy production.  The goal of sanctions 
is to put pressure on Iran’s ability to continue its 
nuclear program.  Sanctions are a method of “hard” 
power and they operate within the framework of 
international liberalism, which emphasizes 
diplomacy as the solution to international problems.  
While sanctions do have an effect in delaying 
nuclear development, thus far, they have not been 
very effective in suppressing Iran’s ambitions for 
nuclear weapons. 
On July 31, 2006, the U.N. Security Council 
passed Resolution 1696, which “demanded that 
Iran suspend all enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities,” including research and 
development, and gave it one month to do so or 
face the possibility of economic and diplomatic 
sanctions.26  Iran refused to comply with this 
resolution.  Facing Iranian defiance, the Security 
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1737 on 
December 23, 2006, which imposed “sanctions on 
Iran’s trade in sensitive nuclear materials and 
technology.”27  This tougher round of sanctions 
demanded that Iran halt its uranium enrichment 
program within 60 days, with threats of further 
sanctions.  Again, Iran defied the will of the 
Security Council, so following the 60-day grace 
period the Security Council passed Resolution 1747 
on March 24, 2007.  This intensified the previous 
sanctions, named specific officials as the targets of 
the sanctions, and added additional sanctions 
against Iranian financial institutions.28  On March 3, 
2008, the U.N. passed Resolution 1803, which 
reaffirmed the previous sanctions and asserted 
greater IAEA rights to verify information provided 
to it by Iran.29  With Iran continuing its violations 
                                                             
26 Security Council 5500th Meeting (AM), “Security  
    Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment  
    by 31 August, Or Face Possible Economic,  
    Diplomatic Sanctions” (July 31, 2006) 
27 Global Policy Forum, “UN Sanctions Against Iran” 
28 Ibid. 
29 Security Council 5848th Meeting (PM), “Security  
    Council Tightens Restrictions on Iran’s Proliferation- 
    Sensitive Nuclear Activities, Increases Vigilance Over  
6
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2011 [2012], Art. 23
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2011/iss1/23
 223
of international calls for an end to its nuclear 
program, the U.N. passed Resolution 1929 on June 
9, 2010.  This resolution imposed additional 
sanctions, expanded an arms embargo, and 
tightened restrictions on “financial and shipping 
enterprises related to ‘proliferation-sensitive 
activities.’”30 
These sanctions have seemingly succeeded in 
complicating Iran’s ability to further develop its 
nuclear program, but have failed to change Iran’s 
behavior.  Iran continues to assert its right to enrich 
uranium without external interference.  In response 
to international criticisms, Iran has argued that “the 
countries that have backed sanctions have provided 
no evidence” to prove that it hopes to construct 
nuclear weapons and it points to a 2007 U.S. 
National Intelligence Estimate that declared that 
Iran had ended its nuclear weapons research in 
2003.31  The fact of the matter is that although its 
excessively large amounts of uranium enriched is 
suspicious, that alone is not sufficient proof that 
Iran is aiming towards nuclear arms.  Iran has 
continued to demonstrate its unwillingness to allow 
foreign states to determine what it claims is a 
purely domestic issue.  With a great deal of 
assistance from North Korea, Iran is not dependent 
on the West for nuclear assistance.  Thus, sanctions 
that limit Iranian trade of nuclear materials and 
technologies with participating U.N. states have 
had little effect on Iran’s program. 
The failure of sanctions is evident by the 
September 2009 revelations about the construction 
of a uranium enrichment facility buried inside a 
mountain near the city of Qom.32  This facility, 
which can hold approximately 3,000 centrifuges, is 
disturbing because it appears to be directly aimed at 
developing nuclear weapons.  Iran has openly 
admitted that the site is too small for peaceful 
civilian purposes, leading the international 
community to believe that it will be used for arms 
development.  Additionally, the facility is “located 
in an underground tunnel complex on the grounds 
of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Base.”33  
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The close proximity between the nuclear facility 
and Iran’s military institution gives further 
credence to the belief that it is being used for 
military and weapons purposes.  Sanctions failed to 
stop Iranian construction of new nuclear facilities, 
and seem incapable of altering its hostile behavior.   
Following the exposure of the Qom facility 
and with increasing fears of more undisclosed 
nuclear facilities, the international community felt 
greater urgency in developing stricter sanctions to 
limit Iran’s access to nuclear materials and 
technologies.  The U.S. has sought to build a 
stronger coalition in the U.N. to strengthen future 
sanctions.  In the past, China and Russia, two veto-
holding members of the Security Council, have 
resisted calls for tough, multilateral sanctions.  
China, an increasingly self-confident power on the 
world stage uses “its diplomatic weight to protect 
countries that Beijing considers to be its allies.”34  
It considers Iran an ally out of economic 
convenience because it has sought increased trade 
with Iran, particularly in the sale of oil, which is in 
great demand because of China’s rapid 
development.  Russia has also argued against the 
use of sanctions on the grounds that sanctions are 
counterproductive because they force Iran to be 
more secretive.  Instead, it believes that “all efforts 
must be focused on supporting the negotiating 
process.”35 
Following the discovery of Qom, China and 
Russia began cooperating with the West on the Iran 
issue.  With their support, the Security Council was 
able to pass Resolution 1929, which was much 
stricter than previous sanctions by expanding 
sanctions with hopes of applying pressure on the 
Iranian economy.  In order for more successful 
sanctions, there must be greater support from the 
rotating members of the Security Council who have 
traditionally called for softer methods of 
engagement with Iran.  Members of the 2010 
Security Council, such as Brazil, Turkey, and 
Lebanon advocated for the use of diplomacy rather 
than sanctions.  They argued “the sanctions that 
have been slapped on Iran have not made the 
Iranian government more responsive to the 
demands of the Security Council and the IAEA.  
However, these sanctions have caused Iranian 
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civilians much hardship.”36  Members of the 2011 
Security Council, such as India and South Africa, 
have also demonstrated reluctance towards 
increasing new rounds of sanctions on Iran, which 
would be targeted the Iranian energy sector.37  They 
oppose sanctions on the grounds that they would 
severely disrupt the international oil markets.  For 
developing economies, maintaining Iran’s oil 
output is of greater importance than the addressing 
the threat of nuclear weapons.  Nuclear 
proliferation is not as serious of a concern for the 
developing world as it is for the developed world.  
Developing countries are more concerned with 
economic development rather than insecurity from 
the nuclear powers.  Iran’s oil production is its 
trump card against calls for stricter economic 
sanctions.  The countries that oppose further 
sanctions against Iran question the legitimacy and 
efficacy of the sanctions.  While the developing 
countries on the Security Council have expressed 
hesitation in applying sanctions, President Obama’s 
openness to engagement with Iran will help to 
ensure that India, South Africa, China, and Russia 
keep an open mind in regards to further U.N. 
sanctions.38   
The consensus amongst the U.S. and its allies 
is that multilateral sanctions have slowed Iran’s 
nuclear program and its suspected effort to develop 
nuclear weapons.  Officials in the United States, 
Europe and Asia believe that their international 
campaign “has restricted Iran’s ability to procure 
the raw materials needed to build an atomic bomb,” 
particularly “carbon fiber and a particular high-
strength steel.”39  The inability to acquire these 
materials has stalled Tehran’s efforts of 
constructing advanced centrifuge machines that 
could accelerate the enrichment of uranium for 
nuclear weapons.  While sanctions have slowed 
Iran’s uranium enrichment, it is clear that by no 
means have they achieved their goal of subduing 
Iran’s ability to construct nuclear arms.  Estimates 
from the U.S. and Israel show that Iran “already has 
enough low-enriched uranium stockpiled to create 
as many as four atomic weapons.”40  There is also 
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the worry that Iran could possibly have advanced 
centrifuges at nuclear facilities that are unknown to 
the IAEA.  Israel still suspects that Iran will be able 
to build a nuclear weapon within the coming few 
years.  Sanctions are unable extinguish the 
ambitions for nuclear weapons, which is largely 
based on security concerns and hegemonic desires.  
Instead, all it can do is slow Iran’s process by 
limiting its access to the nuclear materials market.  
If Iran wants nuclear weapons, sanctions alone will 
not be able to prevent it from doing so. 
 
V. Option 3 - Covert Operations 
 
In addition to sanctions, covert operations 
have been used to slow Iran’s nuclear program by 
sabotaging nuclear equipment and diminishing 
expertise.  Covert operations against Iran’s nuclear 
facilities have utilized cyber-attacks against nuclear 
facilities, and attacks against Iranian nuclear 
scientists.  Given the nature of covert operations, it 
is unknown what specific actions have been taken 
and their effectiveness.  Known covert operations 
against Iran’s nuclear program are the Stuxnet 
computer worm, and the Mossad’s assassinations of 
Iranian scientists. 
Stuxnet, known as the world’s first cyber 
missile, is a computer worm that is designed to 
destroy the power supplies used in nuclear fuel-
refining centrifuge systems.  It is a very mysterious 
computer virus because of its encrypted nature and 
unknown origins.  A Belarus antivirus company 
discovered it in June 2010 and its purpose of 
destroying specific nuclear targets was not 
understood until September of that year.  While the 
origins of the worm are still unknown, many 
computer scientists, nuclear experts, and former 
intelligence officials believe that Stuxnet is a joint 
project between the Americans and the Israelis, 
possibly with some help, from the Germans and the 
British.41  In the last year of his presidency, 
President George W. Bush “authorized new covert 
action intended to sabotage Iran’s suspected effort 
to develop nuclear weapons.”42  This authorized 
covert action is believed to be the origins of the 
development of Stuxnet. 
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Following its complex trail, researchers in 
California and Germany have discovered how 
Stuxnet operates.  They believe that the worm gains 
access to computer systems using an array of 
devious exploits.  Upon entry, it “searches for and 
infects only a specific Siemens-made 
programmable logic controller (PLC) performing 
specific functions.”  Upon finding these targets, the 
worm hunts for “identification numbers unique to a 
special kind of ‘frequency converter drive’ made by 
only two firms in the world: one headquartered in 
Finland, the other in Tehran.” Of these frequency 
converter drives, Stuxnet only targets those 
operating at speeds resembling those that 
centrifuges must achieve in order to separate and 
concentrate uranium to produce nuclear fuel.  The 
worm can either bring these centrifuges to “a 
grinding slowdown or an explosive surge” by 
forcing it to constantly swing its speeds from 
extremes for a long period, which causes the 
centrifuge to break down.43 
In 2009, Stuxnet hit Iran’s uranium enrichment 
facility at Natanz, home to about 5,000 centrifuges.  
The worm damaged and forced the replacement of 
about 1,000 centrifuges.  Through IAEA cameras 
installed at the plant, U.N. inspectors recorded 
“workers hauling away crate after crate of broken 
equipment.”44  Initially, analysts who studied the 
Stuxnet attack on Natanz estimated that the attack 
set Iran’s nuclear program back two years.  They 
claimed, “this was nearly as effective as a military 
strike, but even better since there are no fatalities 
and no full-blown war.  From a military 
perspective, this was a huge success.”45  The worm 
was able to destroy Iranian machines and its 
unknown origins prevent the Iranian regime from 
retaliating. 
Despite the initial enthusiasm about the 
efficacy of Stuxnet in slowing Iran’s nuclear 
program, it appears that the worm was less 
effective against the nuclear program than believed.  
Following the attack, Iranian scientists engaged in a 
“feverish – and apparently successful – effort” to 
contain the damage done by Stuxnet and to replace 
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the damaged parts despite sanctions against Iran’s 
purchase of equipment used in uranium enrichment. 
According to an anonymous Western diplomat with 
access to confidential IAEA reports, Iran seems to 
be have been able to “maintain a constant, stable 
output” of low-enriched uranium despite the 
damage to the centrifuges.  In fact, a February 2011 
IAEA report shows that Iran maintained “steady or 
even slightly elevated production rates” at the 
Natanz enrichment plant in 2010.  The damage to 
Iranian equipment had little to no lasting effect on 
the rate of Iran’s uranium enrichment.46 
Although Iran seemed to have been able to 
easily and quickly replace the damaged centrifuges, 
Stuxnet was not a complete failure.  Iran is believed 
to have only “finite supplies of certain kinds of 
high-tech metals needed to make the machines” due 
to the trade restrictions from the U.N. sanctions.47  
The forced replacement of the Natanz centrifuges 
strains Iran’s limited amount of nuclear supplies, 
and also diminishes its ability to construct new 
machines.  Furthermore, the specificity of the 
worm’s encoding seems to imply that its designers 
had intimate knowledge of the Iran’s centrifuges.  
Despite Iran’s attempted veil of secrecy 
surrounding its nuclear program, Stuxnet 
demonstrates the level of foreign intelligence about 
Iran’s nuclear program.  International computer 
analysts who have examined the worm believe that 
it was created with access to inside information.  
Moreover, the computers at Natanz that control the 
centrifuges are not connected to the Internet, which 
means that Stuxnet could only have been 
introduced through a hand-held USB device.48  
Natanz, and possibly other nuclear facilities, must 
have been infiltrated by foreign intelligence 
agencies.  Iran’s cloak of secrecy has failed to 
protect its nuclear program from foreign 
interference. 
In addition to the Stuxnet cyber-attacks, the 
Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, is believed to 
have implemented assassination plots against key 
Iranian nuclear scientists.  On November 29, 2010, 
Majid Shahriari, Iran’s top nuclear scientist and 
senior manager of Iran’s nuclear effort, was killed 
when “an explosive charge placed in his car was 
detonated by remote control after he climbed into 
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the vehicle.”49  The details of this assassination are 
characteristic of the Mossad, which has carried out 
similar plots in the past.  The effects of Shahriari’s 
assassination have been twofold: it caused the 
immediate loss of “operational expertise and 
detailed knowledge of an effort that has gone on for 
decades” and has also served as a threat to other 
scientists working on Iran’s nuclear program.50  In 
addition to Shahriari’s assassination, Ali 
Mohammadi, an Iranian quantum physics expert, 
was killed when a bomb exploded near his house.  
Many suspect that these assassinations were 
committed by the Mossad.  Both Shahriari and 
Mohammadi were Iranian participants to the 
Sesame project, a scientific study of atomic 
structures that brings together scientists from Israel, 
Arab states, and Iran.51  It is likely that is through 
the Sesame project that the Israelis came into 
contact with the key Iranian nuclear scientists.  The 
Mossad’s assassinations of nuclear scientists have 
diminished Iran’s intellectual supply of scientists 
needed for a successful nuclear program. 
In conjunction with the Mossad’s attacks 
against Iranian nuclear scientists, the United States 
has worked covertly to prevent Iranian construction 
of nuclear weapons.  In 2007, the U.S. escalated 
covert operations in Iran through the C.I.A. and the 
Joint Special Operations Command.  These 
operations were primarily designed to destabilize 
the Iranian regime through support of dissident 
organizations and to gather undermine Iran’s 
nuclear program.  While the exact nature of U.S. 
involvement in Iran is unknown to the public, it 
correlated to an increase in violence in Iran.52   
Publicly known covert operations have been 
successful in limiting Iran’s access to nuclear 
technology and operational knowledge.  Because of 
its clandestine nature, covert operations are 
advantageous because they do not force Iranian 
retaliation.  They are effective tools for disrupting 
Iran’s nuclear progress beyond the public eye, 
decreasing the pressure on Iranian leaders to 
retaliate.  Yoel Guzansky, former head of the Iran 
desk on the Israeli National Security Council, 
praises covert operations as the moderate option 
between sanctions and a use of military force 
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because it delays Iran’s actions and creates time for 
sanctions and diplomacy to work.53  Covert 
operations have successfully slowed aspects of 
Iran’s nuclear development, but have not yet 
completely stopped it.  They may be incapable of 
changing Iranian motives for much of the same 
reasons sanctions can’t.  They do not address Iran’s 
desires for nuclear weapons, but instead merely 
places hurdles between Iran’s nuclear program and 
the capability to construct weapons. 
 
VI. Option 4 - Preventive strike 
 
As opposed to the safer options of sanctions 
and covert operations, preventive strike is a very 
controversial and risky option proposed for dealing 
with Iran’s nuclear program.  The most likely form 
of a preventive strike would be an air raid against 
key Iranian nuclear sites to destroy enough 
centrifuges and other nuclear machines.  The most 
likely candidates to conduct such attacks are Israel 
and the United States.  Israel, when threatened, has 
a history of preventively attacking facilities in the 
Middle East believed to be a part of a nuclear 
weapons program.  In 1981, Israel struck Iraq’s 
nuclear facilities in Osirak, and in 2007, attacked 
Syria’s Deir Ezzor Research Station.  The U.S., 
under both the Bush and Obama administrations, 
has stated reluctance towards the use force against 
Iran’s nuclear program, in spite of encouragement 
to do so by some Arab allies.  Israel, on the other 
hand, has the military capability to unilaterally 
destroy Iranian nuclear facilities and appears to be 
seriously considering it.  Preventive strikes are the 
quintessential course of action within the realism 
paradigm.  Uncertain of Iranian motives, Israel may 
use the option of eliminating the threat through use 
of force. 
Israel’s history of preventive strikes against 
enemy nuclear facilities gives important insight into 
potential future strikes on Iran.  In 1981, Iraq was 
in the midst of constructing a 70-megawatt 
uranium-powered reactor at Osirak, a facility that 
Israeli intelligence believed was designed for the 
production of nuclear weapons.  Acknowledging 
Iraq’s history of aggression against Israel, Israel 
decided to use its air force to prevent Iraq from 
attaining nuclear arms.  On June 7, 1981, Israeli F-
15 interceptors and F-16 fighter-bombers struck 
and decimated the Osirak nuclear reactor near 
Baghdad, about 700 miles from Israel.  Justifying 
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this air strike, the Israeli government stated, “the 
atomic bombs which that reactor was capable of 
producing whether from enriched uranium or from 
plutonium, would be of the Hiroshima size.  Thus a 
mortal danger to the people of Israel progressively 
arose.”54  The potential for such a deadly weapon 
falling into the hands of Israel’s enemies justified 
the use of force for self-defense, and this 
justification would apply to any preventive strikes 
on Iran.  While Israel was able to successfully 
destroy the Osirak reactor relatively easily, 
preventive strikes were by no means successful in 
curtailing Iraq’s nuclear weapons program in the 
long run. 
The strike against Osirak was successful in the 
immediate destruction of the Osirak nuclear 
reactor.  While important, a reactor is not an 
entirely essential part of a successful nuclear 
weapons program.  The Iraqis “would have needed 
to construct a separate plutonium reprocessing 
plant” if it were interested in immediately attaining 
nuclear weapons.55  There was no evidence of Iraq 
having a plutonium reprocessing plant or that it had 
plans to construct one in the immediate future.  The 
strike against the Osirak nuclear reactor was 
unnecessary because Iraq wasn’t in a position to 
construct a nuclear weapon.  Israel prevented the 
construction of nuclear weapons that was not yet 
imminent.  In doing so, the attacks revealed Israel’s 
means of attack and its strong intent in doing so.  
Rather than suppressing Iraq’s nuclear intentions, 
the repercussions of the strikes were that they 
forced Iraq to develop nuclear technology more 
secretly, hampering Israeli intelligence of future 
Iraqi nuclear developments.  
A decade after the attacks on Osirak, the U.S.-
led coalition forces fought Iraq in the first Persian 
Gulf War.  After this conflict, U.N. inspectors 
“unearthed a huge infrastructure for nuclear 
development that had been completely unknown to 
Western intelligence before the war.”56  
Unbeknownst to the international community, Iraq 
had secretly been developing a nuclear program 
that came close to the production of a nuclear 
weapon.  The Israeli strikes against Osirak, while 
delaying Iraq’s nuclear development a decade 
earlier, did not deter Iraq from continuing its 
nuclear program.  The fact that Iraq was capable of 
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almost constructing nuclear weapons demonstrates 
how preventive strikes failed to stop a nuclear 
weapons program. 
 In an echo of the Osirak strike, Israel attacked 
the Deir Ezzor Research Station in Syria in 
September 2007.  The targets of the attack was a 
site that foreign intelligence analysts believed was a 
partly constructed nuclear reactor that was 
“modeled on one North Korea has used to create its 
stockpile of nuclear weapon fuel.”57  It appeared to 
have been the beginning stages of a Syrian nuclear 
program with North Korean assistance.  A senior 
Israeli official speaking on the condition of 
anonymity stated that the strike’s intention was to 
“re-establish the credibility of our deterrent 
power.”58  The message behind the strike against 
the Syrian reactor, which did not pose an 
immediate threat to Israel, seemed to be directed 
towards Iran.  It asserted Israel’s willingness to use 
preventive force to assure its security. 
 While Israel has relied on the use of preventive 
strikes against hostile nuclear-ambitious states in 
the past, it is much less of an attractive option for 
the current situation with Iran.  Iran poses a 
uniquely dangerous threat to Israel.  It understands 
Israeli military capabilities and its means of attacks.  
In response to the potential of an Israeli air strike, 
Iran’s nuclear program entails a large nuclear 
complex that is carefully concealed, extensively 
spread throughout the country, and provides 
multiple routes to nuclear weapons capability.59  
The immensity of the nuclear network and the 
geographic diversity of its various facilities make 
difficult the prospects of successfully halting the 
nuclear program through preventive strikes.  Unlike 
Iraq and Syria, Iran’s nuclear program does not 
provide a clear, singular target because it has 
diversified the locations of its most critical nuclear 
fissile material production sites.  These critical 
nuclear fissile material production sites are the 
uranium conversion facility in Isfahan, the large 
uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, and the 
heavy water plant and plutonium production 
reactors under construction at Arak. These facilities 
are each about 950 to 1,000 miles away from Israel, 
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the far end of the distance margin that Israeli 
fighter planes can safely reach.  These sites are 
imperative to the success of a nuclear weapons 
development, and “destruction of these facilities 
would have the greatest impact on Tehran’s ability 
to manufacture nuclear weapons.”60  In addition to 
the difficulty of striking the numerous facilities 
throughout Iran, the types of facilities discourage 
any use of force. 
The uranium conversion facility at Isfahan 
would be a deadly target for a military strike 
because of the nature of the site.  It is estimated that 
tons of uranium exist at Isfahan in chemical form, 
and preventive strikes against this facility “could 
result in the release of tons of UF6, UF4, and other 
fluorine and uranium products into the 
atmosphere,” which would very likely “result in 
significant production of hydrofluoric acid, a highly 
corrosive chemical” in the atmosphere.61  
Unleashing this chemical into the atmosphere could 
prove deadly for the 1.5 million residents of 
Isfahan, Iran’s third largest city, and can affect the 
lives of millions of people in the region.  The 
results of an attack on the Isfahan uranium 
conversion facility would be detrimental to not only 
Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions, but also to the 
lives of millions of innocent people as well. 
Like Isfahan, air strikes against Natanz and 
Arak may not be necessary.  Preventive strikes 
against Natanz would not be dangerous in the same 
ways as strikes against Isfahan would be.  
However, preventive attacks may be superfluous 
given Stuxnet’s infiltration of Natanz.  The fact that 
the worm must have been introduced manually by a 
USB drive indicates that outside intelligence has 
access to Natanz.  It has been demonstrated that the 
machines at Natanz can be attacked and destroyed 
without the controversy of a preventive strike.  
Arak is currently in the process of constructing a 
heavy water plant and plutonium production 
reactors.  These heavy water reactors pose a great 
risk of plutonium proliferation because those 
produced by the Arak reactors would be weapons 
grade.  It is suspected that the Arak facility will be 
used to recover plutonium from fuel spent in the 
process of producing weapons-grade plutonium.  A 
reliable means of recovering nuclear fuel would be 
vital for the successful construction of nuclear 
weapons.  Its destruction would “significantly slow 
Iran’s future ability to plutonium” and limit Iran’s 
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supply of nuclear materials.62  However, its 
construction is not yet complete, and it is possible 
that those Arak will be infiltrated in the same 
manner as Natanz.  It is too early to contemplate 
preventive strikes against Arak because it has yet to 
be determined how large of a threat it actually 
poses.  Preventive strikes against Natanz and Arak 
are neither currently necessary nor smart given that 
they can be attacked in other ways.  In the 
immediate future, there isn’t much urgency for the 
destruction of these nuclear missile production 
sites. 
While Israel’s air force has demonstrated its 
capability of successfully destroying nuclear 
facilities in Iraq and Syria, Iran poses strategic 
difficulties.  Israel needs U.S. cooperation in case 
of an airstrike because it controls much of the air 
space between Israel and Iran.  This cooperation 
may be difficult given the unpopularity of 
preventive strikes.  Iran also has greater means of 
disrupting Israeli attacks.  Iran’s air defense 
capabilities consist of three elements: aircrafts, 
surface-to-air missiles, and antiaircraft artillery.63  
While these defenses are technologically outdated, 
with most dating back to before the Islamic 
Revolution, they cannot be fully discounted.  They 
are still capable of disrupting the flight of Israeli 
aircrafts.  In addition to its outmoded air defense 
system, the Iranian air force has forty modern MiG-
29s jet fighter aircrafts that can engage in air-to-air 
combat with the Israeli air force.  In any event, 
Israel will not be able to strike Iran’s nuclear 
facilities easily.   
Despite Iran’s technological disadvantages, it 
has two important advantages against an Israeli 
airstrike in Iranian airspace.  First, Iran’s aircrafts 
would be operating in airspace near their docking 
bases.  This will allow them to carry more fuel than 
their Israeli counterparts, giving them an edge 
during instances of protracted air-to-air combat.  
Second, Iranian aircrafts can rely on Ground 
Control Intercept radars to disclose the position of 
Israeli aircrafts.  This would allow the Iranian air 
force to begin engagement with its Israeli 
adversaries from a favorable position, such as 
attacking from behind.64  These advantages can 
create difficulties for Israel if it were to decide to 
attack Iranian nuclear sites. 
                                                             
62 Ibid., 15. 
63 Ibid., 21. 
64 Ibid., 22. 
12
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2011 [2012], Art. 23
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2011/iss1/23
 229
Prior to the pro-democracy protests across the 
Middle East, several Arab states showed support 
for preventive strikes against Iran.  According to 
U.S. State Department cables revealed by 
WikiLeaks, Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, and 
Bahrain lobbied for the U.S. to strike Iranian 
nuclear facilities.  Referring to Iran’s suspected 
nuclear weapons program, Saudi King Abdullah 
asked the U.S. to “cut off the head of the snake” 
before it was too late.65  Arab states that have 
traditionally conflicted with Iran fear the power and 
influence that nuclear weapons would afford Iran.  
The cables also highlight “Israel’s anxiety to 
preserve its regional nuclear monopoly” and its 
readiness to strike Iran alone.66  Arab states 
neighboring Iran have shown support for preventive 
attacks.  Without Arab opposition to preventive 
strikes against Iran, Israel may find unilateral 
preventive strikes very appealing. 
While they are advantageous in some respects, 
preventive strikes are too risky to be carried out.  
Israeli air strikes would likely overcome Iranian 
defenses and succeed in the destroying Iranian 
nuclear targets, but doing so will most likely 
demand retaliation from the Iranians.  Given Iran’s 
views on Israel, tensions would rapidly escalate and 
force Iran to launch counter attacks that can 
escalate into an all-out war.  War with Iran is 
particularly perilous because it “has the largest and 
most ideologically committed military of any state 
in the Persian Gulf region.67  In addition to the 
Iranian military, in case of a war, Hamas and 
Hezbollah, terrorist groups with close ties to Iran, 
would likely assist Iran in inflicting catastrophic 
damage to Israel.  War with Iran will also further 
complicate Israel’s prospects of peace with its 
surrounding countries.  These risks are not worth 
the delaying of an Iranian nuclear program 
preventive strikes are unable to suppress Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions.  They do not address the reasons 
for Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and could only slow 
its nuclear advancement.  Like Iraq, Iran can 
covertly continue its nuclear development after the 
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destruction of its most visible facilities if it chose to 
do so.  A clandestine Iranian nuclear program 
would be even more dangerous to the international 
community. 
Ultimately, the likelihood of preventive strike 
against Iran’s nuclear facilities must be understood 
through the perspective of Israel’s leaders.  Despite 
the shortcomings of preventive strikes, Israel sees 
the world within the theory of realism.  With 
uncertainty and constant security threats, Israel may 
find preventive strikes as the only means of halting 
the potential for Iranian nuclear weapons.  Iran’s 
threat to Israel must be understood in the context of 
the Holocaust and Israeli existential concerns.  
Iranian threats of annihilation may justify Israeli 
use of force.  While the rational deterrence theory 
would theoretically prevent a nuclear war, the 
Israeli leadership may not believe that it applies in 
the case of Iran.  Former Iranian President 
Rafsanjani has said “the use of an atomic bomb 
against Israel would destroy Israel completely 
while [a nuclear attack] against the Islamic 
countries would only cause damages.”  Nuclear war 
between the two may only assure the destruction of 
Israel, and not Iran.  This increases the pressure on 
Israel to terminate Iran’s nuclear weapons program 
before it achieve weapons capability.  The 
likelihood of preventive strikes hinges on the Israeli 
leadership’s perception of the threat.  Further 
development of Iran’s nuclear program with 
increased threats by Iranian leaders may force 
Israeli military action.68 
 
VII. Option 5 - Regime Change 
 
Regime change is an option to prevent Iran 
from attaining nuclear weapons by replacing its 
nuclear ambitious leaders with ones open to 
diplomacy.  Iran’s current nuclear program has 
largely been designed by Ayatollah Khamenei and 
galvanized by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  
This regime zealously defends Iran’s right to 
pursue nuclear technology, limits outside 
knowledge of its nuclear development, and has 
encouraged violence in the Middle East.  Removing 
these nuclear zealots from power would thwart 
Iran’s ambitions for nuclear weapons. 
 Attempts at Iranian regime change can come 
either internally or externally.  External attempts to 
overthrow the current Iranian regime are unlikely.  
Israel, the state most threatened by the current 
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Iranian regime, has demonstrated, at least publicly, 
little interest in actively overthrowing Iran’s 
government.  Doing so would require the use of 
military force and inevitably lead to a deadly, 
protracted war and would disrupt the international 
oil market, among other things.  This would lead to 
condemnation by many in the international 
community.  Overall, external changes to Iran’s 
regime are not a viable option.  
An internal regime change is conceivable, and 
has become increasingly plausible given the current 
unrest in the region.  Iran has a history of 
indigenous revolutions leading to dramatic regime 
changes.  In the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the 
Iranian people rose up against the Shah, and 
replaced the monarchy with a fundamentalist 
Islamic republic.  If Iran’s current regime were to 
be replaced by one less hostile to the international 
community, the issue of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons could be solved diplomatically.  Iran’s 
political climate since 2009 seems to indicate that 
regime change towards democracy is a possibility. 
In the disputed 2009 Iranian Presidential 
election, Mir Hossein Mousavi, a reform candidate, 
sought to “wrest the presidency and executive 
power away from radical hard-liners whose term in 
office had been marked by economic 
incompetence, foreign-policy adventurism, and an 
ideological doctrine that included limits on civil 
right.”69  Following President Ahmadinejad’s 
electoral victory, Mousavi and other opposition 
candidates charged that the elections were rigged.  
Supporters of opposition leaders organized the 
Green Movement, with hopes of annulling the 
presidential election.  They began protesting in 
several major cities.  Despite the initial 
peacefulness of the protests, they quickly turned 
violent.  There were numerous reports of “beatings 
and murders of some demonstrators on Iran’s 
street” by police forces and the Revolutionary 
Guards.70  Violence against protestors transformed 
the Green Movement from a movement against a 
disputed election into a movement against 
Ayatollah Khamenei and the Iranian form of 
government.  With this development, Ayatollah 
Khamenei “ordered a crackdown on any challenges 
to his leadership.”71  Many key opposition leaders 
understood that Khamenei was prepared to 
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massacre thousands of people, and were dissuaded 
from organizing large protests.  The increased 
governmental use of force suppressed the 2009 
Green Movement protests.  
In 2011, following the success of 
demonstrations in Tunisia that brought down 
President Ben Ali and in Egypt against President 
Mubarak, the Green Movement reinvigorated 
protested throughout Iran.  On February 14, 2011, 
thousands of protestors gathered in the streets of 
Tehran and other major Iranian cities to demand 
greater democracy and governmental 
accountability.  However, unlike the preceding 
protests in Tunisia and Egypt where the 
governments were reluctant to use excessive force 
against demonstrators, the Iranian regime resumed 
its 2009 policy of forceful action to quell anti-
governmental protests.  The Revolutionary Guard 
and other security forces were prepared to react 
with force, and in some locations where protests 
were planned, “witnesses reported that police 
officers and baton-holding mercenaries 
outnumbered the protested.”72  The state-sanctioned 
violence against demonstrators was again 
successful in subduing the protests, at least for the 
time being. 
In addition to its use of violence, the Iranian 
government greatly restricted the impact of the 
protests by cutting access between demonstrators 
and opposition leaders.  The two main opposition 
leaders, Mir Hussein Moussavi and Mehdi 
Karroubi, disappeared just prior to the February 
14th protests.  There were contradictory reports over 
whether they had been jailed or had been placed 
under extreme house arrest, completely cut off from 
the outside world.73  It is widely speculated that the 
Iranian government detained the two with hopes of 
containing the protest’s democratic fervor.  If true, 
this detention of opposition leaders is a risky course 
of action for the Iranian regime.  Cutting access to 
opposition leaders can limit the strength and 
direction of the demonstrators, but it can also 
galvanize protestors by fueling their anger.  Ali 
Afshari, an exiled former student leader, believed 
that there is fear in the Iranian government that 
imprisoning the opposition leaders “would give 
their restless supporters in the Green Movement a 
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new cause to rally around.”74  The regime’s actions 
for suppressing the protests may backfire and 
engender greater protests, now and in the future. 
In addition to the regime’s use of force against 
Iranian protestors, Iran has also played a role in the 
protests in nearby countries.  It is deeply involved 
in some protests and recognizes that its interests are 
connected to the regional protests.  One regime that 
Iran is aiding is Syria, where pro-democracy 
protests have turned violent.  Iran has provided 
Syria with the equipment necessary to disperse 
protestors, block the Internet, and track cellphones.  
These are the techniques that Iran uses to 
successfully suppress its own protests.  Iran’s 
interest in buttressing the Syrian regime is due to 
their shared ideology and Syria’s location, which 
allows Iran to send weapons to Hezbollah and 
Hamas.  Because of the relationship between Iran 
and Syria, the fall of the Syrian regime would likely 
galvanize the protests for regime change in Iranian.  
To protect itself from collapse, Iran’s regime is 
protecting the Syrian regime.75 
While suppressing protests in Iran and Syria, 
the regime has also fomented protests in Bahrain, a 
small country with a Shi’a majority and a Sunni 
regime.  The protests have increasingly become a 
proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  With 
the collapse of the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain, 
which is supported by Saudi Arabia, Iran would 
gain greater influence in the region.76  The 
replacement of a Sunni regime with a Shi’a one 
would increase Iran’s clout of leadership.  This 
perception of regional leadership may decrease 
public desire in Iran for regime change, and 
increase the regime’s willingness to use force to 
quell protests.  Increased regional leadership would 
encourage nationalism in Iran that would shield the 
regime from some criticisms.  Ultimately, it is 
impossible to determine whether Iran’s anti-
government protests will succeed because events in 
Iran are tied to events throughout the Middle East.  
The success of the Iranian protesters partly depends 
on the success of pro-democracy protests elsewhere 
in the region. 
If the Iranian opposition is successful in 
overthrowing the current regime, the form and 
ideology of any subsequent regimes is unclear.  
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While Iranian opposition leaders have embraced 
democratic values, there isn’t a guarantee that these 
values will materialize in a new regime.  Even if 
democratic, a new Iranian regime may continue the 
current regime’s policies for nuclear development.  
While a democratic government is likely be more 
receptive to meaningful negotiations on the nuclear 
issue with the international community, history 
shows that democratic governments can defy the 
international community in pursuit of nuclear 
weapons.  For example, the democratic regimes of 
the Republic of India, the State of Israel, and the 
Republic of South Africa have all developed 
nuclear weapons in the past.  There is no guarantee 
a new Iranian regime would give up ambitions for 
nuclear weapons. 
Iranian opposition leaders have defended 
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology, but have stated 
that they are open to reforming Iranian nuclear 
policies.  During the 2009 elections, Mir Hussein 
Moussavi stated that if elected, he would be open to 
negotiations with the United States if it changed its 
policy towards Iran.  He has said that “the 
consequences of giving up the country’s nuclear 
program would be irreparable and that the Iranian 
people support the nuclear program” because the 
program is “considered a source of national 
pride.”77  His comments demonstrate an 
unwillingness to give up nuclear development 
entirely, but also openness to compromise on the 
purpose of nuclear technology and on the degree of 
international regulation.  The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty does allow for Iran to develop 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and on 
the basis of the treaty, diplomacy can be used to 
halt Iranian production of nuclear arms.  Diplomacy 
can be used to enforce NPT stipulations.  If the 
current protests in Iran successfully lead to a 
democratic regime, there is an opening for the U.S. 
and Israel to work with Iran in order to prevent the 
construction of nuclear weapons. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the fears of the 
international community can be understood within 
the framework of realism.  Iran wants nuclear 
weapons primarily for security purposes and to 
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attain regional hegemony.  These desires do not 
necessarily pose dangers to the international 
community.  Nuclear proliferation isn’t inherently 
dangerous, only the use of nuclear weapons is.  
While the international community has been 
primarily focused on how to stop its nuclear 
program, the real concern ought to be to limit Iran’s 
nuclear program to strictly peaceful purposes.  To 
ensure that Iran’s nuclear program remains 
peaceful, the reasons for its nuclear ambitions must 
be addressed.  Otherwise, Iran will continue its 
nuclear program belligerently defiant of the 
international community.   
The best means of ensuring a peaceful nuclear 
program would involve a combination of some of 
the options presented.  Sanctions are an important 
aspect of any package of actions for preventing Iran 
from developing nuclear weapons, but they cannot 
be the only option.  History shows the 
ineffectiveness of solely relying on sanctions to 
change undesirable behaviors.  Current sanctions 
on Iran limit its access to nuclear materials, and 
also threaten the prospects for Iranian hegemony by 
detaching it from the international community.  
Despite these benefits of sanctions, they may be 
detrimental to the average Iranian citizen.  This is a 
major concern brought up by some members of the 
Security Council who fear that sanctions punish the 
wrong entities.  It may turn the Iranian public 
against the international community, which can 
stimulate Iranian nationalism against the outside 
world.  As such, all unilateral and multilateral 
sanctions need to be targeted strictly against parts 
of the nuclear program.   
Covert operations should also be continued, 
but done so more prudently.  These operations can 
effectively slow Iran’s nuclear development 
without forcing Iran to retaliate.  Insofar as Iran’s 
nuclear program is a source of national pride, 
publicly known attacks on the program may lead to 
public desires for retributions, which can escalate 
into war.  In order to avoid this, covert operations 
must be done more carefully.  A very effective use 
of covert operation would be to use it to lend 
support to the Green Movement.  With regime 
change increasingly likely due to the state of affairs 
in the Middle East, international powers can 
empower protestors.  
The Green Movement is no longer merely a 
movement against the re-election of President 
Ahmadinejad, but has taken on an ideological 
fervor for democracy.  The success of the Green 
Movement will be tied to the success of similar 
revolutions across the Middle East.  Success in 
countries like Libya and Syria will encourage 
protesters in Iran.  Covert aid to demonstrators can 
help protect them from excessive governmental 
force.  The clandestine nature of this aid is very 
important though because protests need to be 
indigenous in order to succeed.  Regime change 
that doesn’t appear to be purely indigenous would 
be quickly characterized as Western imperialism 
and would give the Iranian regime greater 
justification for its use of force.   
Regime change to a democratic regime in Iran 
is the best outcome for the international 
community.  Sanctions and covert operations 
should try to encourage regime change in order to 
directly address Iran’s nuclear weapons ambition.  
A truly democratic Iran may not give up its nuclear 
program entirely, but it will be open to better 
relations and diplomacy with the West.  This can 
lead to greater international inspections and 
regulations of Iran’s nuclear program to ensure that 
it is for peaceful objectives.  Beyond the issue of 
nuclear proliferation, regime change would also be 
very desirable to diffuse other pressing issues in the 
Middle East that originate from the Iranian regime. 
Ultimately if this fails, allowing Iran to 
develop its nuclear program is better than the 
option of preventive strikes Iranian nuclear 
facilities.  The risks associated with Iranian nuclear 
weapons are insufficient in warranting preventive 
strikes that will surely lead to a deadly war.  Iran’s 
vast military and association with terrorist 
organizations make it a strong adversary in a war.  
Preventive strikes are also unable to suppress the 
ambition for nuclear weapons, but can only delay 
its production.  After a strike, Iran can rebuild and 
resume a nuclear program more clandestinely.  A 
covert nuclear program would be much more 
deadly than the current Iranian nuclear program 
with its limited international oversight.  The 
dangers of Iran’s nuclear program are not as great 
as is commonly perceived.  While it is in the best 
interest of the international community to prevent 
Iran from developing nuclear weapons through 
diplomacy and safe attacks on its program, if these 
options fail, the international community must 
come to terms with Iranian ambitions for nuclear 
technology and possibly nuclear weapons. 
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